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Security in Computer Networks

**Goal:** we want to enable secure communication between two parties in a distributed system. This requires implementing three related **security functions**:

**Authentication:** (1) Ensuring that a message is genuine, has arrived exactly as it was sent, and came from the stated source; (2) Verifying the identity of an individual, such as a person at a remote terminal or the sender of a message.

**Data integrity:** The property that data has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner.

**Confidentiality (secrecy):** The property that information is not been made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes.

Implementing these functions generally requires the use of **cryptographic protocols**.

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**Cryptography**

**Secret key:** Use a single key to (1) encrypt the plaintext and (2) decrypt the ciphertext. Requires that sender and receiver share the secret key.

**Public key:** Use different keys for encryption and decryption, of which one is private, and the other public.

**Hashing:** Just use a hash function on the plaintext and send it off. There's no decryption at all, just verification.
Cryptology – Devising Ciphers

**Substitution:** Just replace some characters with others following a predefined mapping ⇒ implement by means of an **S-box**.

**Transposition:** Reshuffle the characters following a predefined pattern (e.g., a transposition table) ⇒ implement by means of an **P-box**.

**Combine:** Cascading a lot of S and P boxes does the trick.

![Diagram of S-box and P-box](image)

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**One-Time Pads**

**Simple idea:** Choose a random bit string, as long as the plaintext, and simply XOR it to get the ciphertext. It can never be broken because the ciphertext has no information in it at all.

- They cannot be memorized
- The length of the transmitted data is limited by the key length
- Requires strict synchronization between sender and receiver: a single missed bit will screw up everything.
DES: Data Encryption Standard

- Each iteration $i$ uses a different key $K_i$. The complexity lies in the mangler function $f$.
- The keys $K_i$ are derived from the initial 56-bit key.

The real problem is the 56-bit key: it’s too easy to break.

08 – 5 Network Security/8.2 Symmetric-Key Algorithms

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**Triple DES**

**Problem:** The 56-bit key is way too short. The solution is to expand DES to a form with a 112-bit key.

**Observation:** By using an encrypt-decrypt-encrypt scheme, Triple DES is compatible with single DES by setting $K_1 = K_2$. 

08 – 6 Network Security/8.2 Symmetric-Key Algorithms
AES/Rijndael

**Problem:** DES is just too weak. The Advanced Encryption Standard is now gradually being used as the way to do symmetric encryption. AES is also known as Rijndael (winner of the AES contest).

```c
#define LENGTH 16   /* # bytes in data block or key */
#define NROWS 4      /* number of rows in state */
#define NCOLS 4      /* number of columns in state */
#define ROUNDS 10    /* number of iterations */

typedef unsigned char byte;
    /* unsigned 8-bit integer */

rijndael(byte plaintext[LENGTH], byte ciphertext[LENGTH], byte key[LENGTH])
    { int r;                /* loop index */
byte state[NROWS][NCOLS];  /* current state */
struct [byte k[NROWS][NCOLS]]; rk[ROUNDS + 1];  /* round keys */
expand_key(key, rk);
    /* construct the round keys */
copy_plaintext_to_state(state, plaintext);    /* init current state */
xor_roundkey_into_state(state, rk(0));  /* XOR key into state */
for (r = 1; r <= ROUNDS; r++) {
    substitute(state);              /* apply S-box to each byte */
    rotate_rows(state);             /* rotate row i by i bytes */
    if (r < ROUNDS) mix_columns(state);    /* mix function */
    xor_roundkey_into_state(state, rk(r));    /* XOR key into state */
}
copy_state_to_ciphertext(ciphertext, state);     /* return result */
}
```

**Cipher Block Chaining Mode**

**Problem:** A 64-bit plaintext will always come out the same way. Great, now we can fool around a bit – just see if you can divide your input file into chunks of 64 bits width:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Bonus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Bonus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Bytes | 16 | 8 | 8 |

**Solution:** Use a predecessing, encrypted block to permute the current block before it’s encrypted. Decryption works the other way around.
Cipher Feedback Mode

**Issue:** You don’t always want to wait until a full 64-bit block has come in before starting to encrypt. You want to operate on bytes.

![Diagram](a)

**Idea:** when a plaintext byte ($P_{10}$) needs to be encrypted, simply use a 64-bit ciphertext and select the leftmost byte to (1) send over the network, (2) push it in a shift register.

Stream Cipher Mode

**Essence:** Take an initialization vector (IV) and encrypt it, and use a key to an output block. The output block is encrypted to get another block, and so on. This gives an arbitrarily large sequence of output blocks that can be used to encrypt a stream:

![Diagram](b)

**Note:** Never use the same (keystream, IV) pair or it will otherwise generate the same keystream.
RSA: Rivest, Shamit, Adleman

Really nifty: The whole idea is that you use a private and a public key. First find the right number for encryption:

1. Choose two large primes $p$ and $q$
2. Compute $n = p \times q$ and $z = (p - 1) \times (q - 1)$
3. Choose a number $d$ relatively prime to $z$
4. Find $e$ such that $e \times d = 1 \mod z$

Next step: Consider your plaintext as a bitstring; divide into blocks, where each block is considered to be a binary number $0 \leq P < n$.

Sending: encrypt each message $P$ into $C$ as: $C = P^e \mod n$, and send it off. Note: you need $e$ and $n$.

Receiving: decrypt an incoming message into $Q = C^d \mod n$. Guess what: $Q = P^{ed} = P$. Note: you need $d$ and $n$.

Note: if gcd($a,n$) = 1, then $a^{(p-1)(q-1)} \mod n = 1$. Consequently, $P^{ed} \mod n = P^{ed-1} \times P \mod n = P \mod n$.

Digital Signatures

What we often really need is to authenticate a message, and assure its integrity:

1. Receiver can verify the claimed identity of the sender
2. The sender can later not deny that he/she sent the message
3. The receiver can not tamper the message itself.

The solution is to digitally sign the message. This means:

- have the sender put a signature that can be verified
- be sure that the signature cannot be faked, i.e. it should be uniquely associated with the message.
Symmetric-Key Signatures

**Basic idea:** Pretty simple – just use a Big Brother who passes the message, but signed, to the destination:

1. Alice sends $[A, K_A(B, R_A, t, P)]$ to Big Brother.

2. Bib Brother signs $[A, t, P]$ and sends it along with the original message, encrypted with Bob’s secret key: $[K_B(A, R_A, t, P, K_{BB}(A, t, P))]$.

**Note:** Using $R_A$ and timestamps helps against replays.

**Question:** Why is signing by Big Brother necessary?

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Public-Key Signatures

1. Alice encrypts her message $P$ with her private key $D_A$: $P_A = D_A(P)$.

2. She then encrypts $P_A$ with Bob’s public key $E_A$: $E_A(P_A)$, and sends it off.

3. Bob decrypts the incoming message with his private key $D_B$. We know for sure that no one else has been able to read $P_A$ during its transmission.

4. Bob decrypts the message with Alice’s public key $E_A$, now knowing that it came from Alice.

**Note:** we’re assuming that $E_X(D_X(P)) = D_X(E_X(P))$
Message Digests

Idea: take an arbitrary length message, and compute a unique, fixed-length number from it. Also called message digest, or one-way function.

- Computing the hash $h(m)$ for any message $m$ is relatively easy.
- Given a hash value $h(m)$, the only way of getting $m$ is to enumerate over all possible messages. In other words, $h^{-1}$ is almost impossible to find.
- It is computationally infeasible to find two messages $m_1$ and $m_2$ such that $h(m_1) = h(m_2)$.

Used for: password hashing (store hash values for comparison instead of cleartext passwords), message fingerprinting (add a message digest to the message to safeguard against changes), signatures (sign the message digest instead of the entire message).

Message Digests: Signatures

Basic idea: Don’t mix authentication and secrecy. Instead, it should also be possible to send a message in the clear, but have it signed as well.

Solution: take a message digest, and sign that:
Public-Key Management

Problem: If two parties don’t know each other, how can they get a hold of each other’s public key and be certain that it’s the right key?

Solution: Introduce a trusted third party that signs public keys by means of a certificate. The public key of this certification authority must be well known.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Version</td>
<td>Which version of X.509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serial number</td>
<td>This number plus the CA’s name uniquely identifies the certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signature algorithm</td>
<td>The algorithm used to sign the certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issuer</td>
<td>X.500 name of the CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validity period</td>
<td>The starting and ending times of the validity period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject name</td>
<td>The entity whose key is being certified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public key</td>
<td>The subject’s public key and the ID of the algorithm using it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issuer ID</td>
<td>An optional ID uniquely identifying the certificate’s issuer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject ID</td>
<td>An optional ID uniquely identifying the certificate’s subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extensions</td>
<td>Many extensions have been defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signature</td>
<td>The certificate’s signature (signed by the CA’s private key)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Public-Key Infrastructures

Issue: We can’t have just a single CA; we probably want several to distribute the work. The solution is simple: build a hierarchy (and cache certificates):

Question: What would be a good way to revoke certificates?
**IPSec**

**Issue:** How can we incorporate real security in IP? The solution so far is IPSec by which IP packets can be sent securely over the Internet. Key establishment is still an open question (the original proposal is heavily flawed).

**Transport mode:** A separate IPSec header is inserted just after the normal IP header. It contains the information needed for secure transmission of the entire packet.

**Tunnel mode:** An entire IP packet is encapsulated in a new IPSec packet. Good for communication to/from a firewall that can leave the stations behind it unaware of IPSec.

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**IPSec Header**

- **Index:** an identifier that associates this packet with a previous one. Essentially an index for the receiver to lookup the shared key they both use.

- **Sequence number:** all packets get a unique number (including retransmissions). Used for detecting replay attacks.

- **Authentication data:** contains the sender's digital signature.

**Note:** IPSec does not allow data to be encrypted; it is mainly used for integrity checking only.
Firewalls

**Essence:** Sometimes it's better to select service requests at the lowest level: network packets. Packets that do not fit certain requirements are simply removed.

**Solution:** Protect your company by a firewall: it implements access control

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**Question:** What do you think would be the biggest breach in firewalls?

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Virtual Private Networks

**Issue:** Build your own private network that can span several different locations, for example, building IPSec tunnels between firewalls:

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Wireless Security

802.11 (WEP): Based on keystreams. Unfortunately, the selection and use of the initialization vector is heavily flawed; the encryption algorithm has been broken; and it took only two hours for two students to build the software to eavesdrop on an industry 802.11 network.

Bluetooth: Far more sophisticated and applied to different layers of the protocol stack. See Tanenbaum for further details.

Authentication

Note: The whole business of security is that we can ensure authorized access to resources. In practice, this means that we pay a lot of attention to authentication first. Confidentiality, i.e. privacy, is practically less important.

Question: this is not entirely true – what’s the big exception here?

Note: A stronger version of authentication is nonrepudiation: it is not possible for someone to deny that they sent a message.

Question: How can we safeguard against repudiation?
Authentication versus Integrity

Note: Authentication and data integrity rely on each other: Consider an active attack by an enemy $X$ on the communication from $A$ to $B$.

Authentication without integrity: $A$’s message is authenticated, and intercepted by $X$, who tampers with its content, but leaves the authentication part as is. $B$ will conclude the message came from $A$ – it came from $X$, so authentication fails.

Integrity without authentication: $X$ intercepts a message from $A$, and then makes $B$ believe that the content was really sent by $X$. The data has now been “changed” in an unauthorized manner, so integrity is violated. In other words: integrity is meaningless if you don’t know the source of information.

Question: What can we say about confidentiality versus authentication and integrity?

Authentication Protocols
Secret Keys

1. Alice sends ID to Bob
2. Bob sends challenge $R_B$ (i.e. a random number) to Alice
3. Alice encrypts $R_B$ with shared key $K_{AB}$. Now Bob knows he’s talking to Alice
4. Alice send challenge $R_A$ to Bob
5. Bob encrypts $R_A$ with $K_{AB}$. Now Alice knows she’s talking to Bob

Note: We can “improve” the protocol by combining steps 1 & 4, and 2 & 5. This costs only the correctness.
1. Trudy claims she is Alice, and sends challenge $R_T$
2. Bob sends back a challenge $R_B$ and the encrypted $R_T$
3. Trudy starts a second session, claiming she is Alice, but uses challenge $R_B$
4. Bob sends back a challenge, plus $\{R_B\}_{K_{AB}}$.
5. Trudy sends back $\{R_B\}_{K_{AB}}$ for the first session to prove she is Alice

**It's even worse:** Assume that Alice is a general-purpose computer:

**Observation:** Trudy can successfully start two different sessions.
Authentication Protocols
Hashing Traffic

Important: The hash (HMAC) is computed using the knowledge shared by Alice and Bob. Essentially, Alice verifies that Bob is at the other end by computing the hash herself.

Establishing a Shared Key: Diffie-Hellman

- Alice and Bob have to agree on two large prime numbers, $n$ and $g$. Both numbers may be public.
- Alice chooses large number $x$, and keeps it to herself. Bob does the same, say $y$.

1. Alice sends $(n, g^x \mod n)$ to Bob
2. Bob sends $(g^y \mod n)$ to Alice
3. Alice computes $K_{AB} = (g^y \mod n)^x = g^{xy} \mod n$
4. Bob computes $K_{AB} = (g^x \mod n)^y = g^{xy} \mod n$
**Bucket-Brigade Attack**

**Problem:** Diffie Hellman works fine, but there is no way that Bob knows for sure he's getting information from Alice. Here comes Trudy again:

1. Alice picks $x$
2. Trudy picks $z$
3. $g^z \bmod n$
4. Bob picks $y$
5. $g^y \bmod n$

**Needham-Schroeder (simplified)**

**Idea:** There is a KDC which shares a key with a number of principals. A principal can request a session key to be used for a secure channel with another principal (also known to the KDC).

1. Alice asks KDC a session key for channel to Bob, with challenge $R_A$. KDC generates $K_S$ and **ticket** $T_B = K_B(A, K_S)$.
2. KDC sends $K_A(R_A, B, K_S, T_B)$
3. Alice just sends the ticket, as well as a challenge $K_S(R_{A2})$. Bob retrieves the session key from the ticket.

4. Bob sends proof back and challenges Alice: $[K_S(R_{A2} - 1), B]$.

5. Alice returns proof of the challenge: $K_S(R_B - 1)$.

Q1: Why does the KDC put Bob into its reply message, and Alice into the ticket?

Q2: The ticket sent back to Alice by the KDC is encrypted with Alice’s key. Is this necessary?

Security flaw: Suppose Trudy finds out Alice’s key ⇒ she can use that key anytime to impersonate Alice, even if Alice changes her private key at the KDC.

Reasoning: Once Trudy finds out Alice’s key, she can use it to decrypt a (possibly old) ticket for a session with Bob, and convince Bob to talk to her using the old session key.

Solution: Have Alice get an encrypted number from Bob first, and put that number in the ticket provided by the KDC ⇒ we’re now ensuring that every session is known at the KDC.
1. Alice sends a challenge $R_A$ to Bob, encrypted with Bob’s public key $E_B$.
2. Bob decrypts the message, proves he’s Bob (by sending $R_A$ back), and sends a challenge $R_B$ to Alice, along with a session key $K_S$. Everything’s encrypted with Alice’s public key $E_A$.
3. Alice proves she’s Alice by sending back the decrypted challenge, but now encrypted with the session key $K_S$.

Pretty Good Privacy (1/2)

1. Calculate hash (MD5) of message, and encrypt that hash with Alice’s private key $D_A$ you’ve got Alice’s signature.
2. Append signature to text, and compress it to P1.Z.
3. Encrypt P1.Z with IDEA, and send along key $K_M$, after encrypting it with Bob’s public key $E_B$ for decryption.
Some observations:

- Expensive RSA is used only to encrypt two 128-bit messages. IDEA, which is much more efficient, is used for the hard stuff.

- Public keys are stored locally and can be retrieved in different ways. For that reason, there is a value indicating the strength of the trust the holder has in that key. Don’t use low-trusted keys for high-security messages.

- A user can maintain several private-public key pairs. This allows easy switching to another key pair when one is suspected to have been compromised.

Web Security

- Secure naming
- Secure sockets
- Mobile code security
**Secure Naming (1/2)**

**Essence:** Break into DNS and replace the name-to-address mapping of a DNS name.

1. Give me Bob’s IP address
2. 36.1.2.3 (Bob’s IP address)
3. GET index.html
4. Bob’s home page

Bob’s Web server (36.1.2.3)

Alice

Cracked DNS server

Trudy’s Web server (42.9.9.9)

1. Give me Bob’s IP address
2. 42.9.9.9 (Trudy’s IP address)
3. GET index.html
4. Trudy’s fake of Bob’s home page

Trudy’s fake of Bob’s home page

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Network Security/8.9 Web Security

**Secure Naming (2/2)**

**Observation:** DNS uses UDP which prevents checking whether replies are actually from the host you queried. Trudy can now “easily” spoof DNS:

1. Look up foobar.trudy-the-intruder.com (to force it into the ISP’s cache)
2. Look up www.trudy-the-intruder.com (to get the ISP’s next sequence number)
3. Request for www.trudy-the-intruder.com (Carrying the ISP’s next sequence number, n)
4. Quick like a bunny, look up bob.com (to force the ISP to query the com server in step 5)
5. Legitimate query for bob.com with seq = n+1
6. Trudy’s forged answer: Bob is 42.9.9.9, seq = n+1
7. Real answer (rejected, too late)

**Assumption:** The DNS cache is initially empty (or cached entry has expired).
Secure DNS

Solution: Normally, entries are filled by having one server send its local database (zone) to the requester. Simply let the originator sign what it sends.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain name</th>
<th>Time to live</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bob.com</td>
<td>86400</td>
<td>IN</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>36.1.2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bob.com</td>
<td>86400</td>
<td>IN</td>
<td>KEY</td>
<td>3682793A7B73F731029CE2737D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bob.com</td>
<td>86400</td>
<td>IN</td>
<td>SIG</td>
<td>86947503ABB848F5272E5993C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When you need to know an IP address, you get the relevant resource records back associated with, for example, bob.com. Assume you know the public key of com. You now have bob.com's public key, which allows to check www.bob.com.

Secure Sockets Layer

Essence: SSL is a secure-message layer just on top of the transport layer. It consists of two separate phases: (1) establishing a secure connection, and (2) using it.

![SSL Diagram]

Note: $[K^Y_X]$ denotes the public key of $X$, signed by $Y$. $R$ is a random number generated and signed by the client for authentication.

Question: How can authentication work here?
Mobile Code Security

**Java Applets:** Interpreted code that can be run in a **sandbox**, by which every instruction is inspected before being executed.

**ActiveX:** Whether or not an ActiveX control is run depends on who (if anything) signed the code and if that entity is trusted. If trusted, the control can do anything a normal program can do.